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Figure 1: Given a face image, our network anonymizes the face based on the desired identity. In the figure, it can be seen the
variability of the generated faces, controlled from a given label. In each triplet, the first image is the real image, while the
other two images are different anonymized versions of the real image.
Abstract
The unprecedented increase in the usage of computer vi-
sion technology in society goes hand in hand with an in-
creased concern in data privacy. In many real-world sce-
narios like people tracking or action recognition, it is im-
portant to be able to process the data while taking care-
ful consideration in protecting people’s identity. We pro-
pose and develop CIAGAN, a model for image and video
anonymization based on conditional generative adversar-
ial networks. Our model is able to remove the identifying
characteristics of faces and bodies while producing high-
quality images and videos that can be used for any computer
vision task, such as detection or tracking. Unlike previ-
ous methods, we have full control over the de-identification
(anonymization) procedure, ensuring both anonymization
as well as diversity. We compare our method to several
baselines and achieve state-of-the-art results. To facilitate
further research, we make available the code and the mod-
els at https://github.com/dvl-tum/ciagan.
All human beings have three lives: public, private, and
secret.
Gabriel Garcı´a Ma´rquez, [24]
* Authors contributed equally.
1. Introduction
The ubiquitous usage of computer vision technology in
society implies the automatic processing of large-scale vi-
sual data containing, more often than not, personal data.
While we are eager to take advantage of technology for
house monitoring, video conferencing and surveillance, we
are not willing to do so by giving away our personal privacy.
In fact, data privacy is an increasing concern, and entities
such as the European Union have already passed laws such
as the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR)[1], to
guarantee data privacy. For computer vision researchers,
the creation of high-quality datasets which include peo-
ple is becoming extremely challenging, as every person in
the dataset needs to consent for the usage of his or her
image data. Recently, a popular dataset for person re-
identification, the Duke MTMC dataset [10], was taken of-
fline for privacy reasons.
Our key observation is that many computer vision tasks
such as person detection, multiple people tracking, or ac-
tion recognition, do not need to identify the people on the
videos, they just need to detect them. Classic anonymiza-
tion techniques, such as face blurring, significantly alter the
image and consequently result in a large detection perfor-
mance drop.
We propose a model to anonymize (or de-identify) im-
ages and videos by removing the identification character-
istics of people, while still keeping necessary features to
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allow face and body detectors to work. Importantly, the
images should still look realistic to a human observer, but
people on them should not be identifiable. Our proposed ap-
proach can be used to anonymize computer vision datasets
while retaining necessary information for tasks such as
detection, recognition or tracking. We leverage the gen-
erative power of Conditional Generative Adversarial Net-
works (CGAN) [25, 15] to generate anonymized images and
videos that look realistic. In existing GAN-based methods,
the image generation process is typically controlled by a
random noise vector to generate diverse outputs. Such a
random process is not suitable for anonymization purposes,
where we need to have guarantees that the identity has actu-
ally changed from input to output. To tackle this issue, we
propose a novel identity control discriminator. Our CIA-
GAN model fulfills the following important properties that
an anonymization system should have:
(i) Anonymization: the produced output must hide the
identity of the person in the original image. Essen-
tially, we are generating a new fake identity out of the
input image.
(ii) Control: the fake identity of the generated images is
governed by a control vector, so we have full control
over the real person-fake identity mapping.
(iii) New identities: the generated images must contain
only new identities not present in the training set.
(iv) Realistic: output images must look realistic in order
to be used by state-of-the-art detection and recognition
systems.
(v) Temporal consistency: temporal consistency and
pose preservation in videos should be ensured for tasks
like people tracking or action recognition.
By satisfying the aforementioned five properties, we en-
sure the anonymization of images and videos and the pro-
tection of data privacy. At the same time, our method guar-
antees that detectors will be able to use the anonymized
data, as our experiments demonstrate.
Our contribution in this work is four-fold:
• We propose a general framework that is suitable for the
anonymization of people in images and video streams.
• We show that images anonymized by our method can
be used by existing detection and recognition systems.
• We demonstrate state-of-the-art results in several
datasets, while at the same time qualitatively demon-
strate diversity and control over the generated images.
• We perform a comprehensive ablation study, showing
the importance of each building block of our model.
2. Related Work
Face Generation Since the advent of Generative Adver-
sarial Networks [8, 28], generation of realistic faces has
been an active research area [20, 16, 17]. Current state-
of-the-art models [17] are able to generate high-resolution
face images by progressively training large convolutional
neural networks. Diversity in appearance, race, hair and
eye color is achieved by adaptive instance normalization
[13]. Despite their impressive quality, by conditioning on
random noise and having no information about the origi-
nal face, those methods do not have control over the pose
of the generated face. Thus the blending of the face with
the other parts of the body is challenging and remains an
open research problem. Consequently, their usability in
anonymization applications is limited.
Image-to-Image and Video-to-Video Translation
Pix2Pix networks [15] and their unsupervised variant [41]
have shown impressive results on cross-domain image
translation, e.g., from winter to summer. Nevertheless,
it is not clear how suitable they are on making subtle
but important changes in images coming from the same
domain, such as faces or bodies. Closely related, there
has been recent work on ensuring temporal consistency
across videos for the task of face translation [39]. To ensure
temporal consistency, [39] condition the generator on both
the previous real and generated frames, in addition to the
estimated optical flow between the frames. While the work
demonstrates smooth temporal consistency, generated faces
usually resemble closely the original identities, and are not
suitable for the anonymization task.
Face Anonymization Until recently, face anonymization
has been achieved by pixelization, blurring or masking the
faces. Alternatively, [32] proposes to use segmentation-
based methods. Being based on heuristics rather than being
learned, there is no guarantee that these operations are opti-
mal for the task of de-identification. Critically, these meth-
ods often make faces undetectable and therefore unusable
in standard computer vision pipelines. We advocate the us-
age of machine learning to achieve anonymization that pre-
serves important features that are necessary for computer
vision tasks such as detection and tracking. This was pre-
viously explored in [29, 34, 14, 35, 7]. However, all these
works come with important limitations. The faces gener-
ated by [14] are still, in general, identifiable by humans.
[29] exhibits a similar issue and, furthermore, the method
has no control over the generation process, with every iden-
tity being mapped to the same fake identity. The work of
[34] focuses on altering facial landmarks which can lead to
unnatural looking results. Furthermore, their method does
not have explicit control over generated appearance. The
results of [35] are visually appealing, but due to an opti-
mization procedure for face alignment, the method is not
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Figure 2: Our CIAGAN model takes as input the image, its landmark, the masked face and the desired identity. The generator is an
encoder-decoder model where the encoder embeds the image information into a low dimensional space. The identity given as a one-hot
label is encoded via a transposed convolutional neural network and is fed in the bottleneck of the generator. Then the decoder decodes
the combined information of source images and the identities into a generated image. The generator plays an adversarial game with a
discriminator in a standard GAN-setting. Finally, we introduce an identity discriminator network, whose goal is to provide a guiding signal
to the generator about the desired identity of the generated face.
computationally efficient. Additionally, the method is de-
signed to work only with faces since it is based on a para-
metric face model, so it is not straightforward to extend it to
other domains such as full human bodies.
The state-of-the-art method is that of [7], where au-
thors show good qualitative results and an unprecedented
de-identification rate. However, while the generated im-
ages can fool recognition systems, in general, humans can
recognize the identity of the presented faces. More criti-
cally, none of these methods except for [14] and [7] make
any attempt at working with videos. [14] shows limited
experiments in video processing, but the temporal consis-
tency is not well-preserved. [7] shows very good tempo-
ral consistency, but as in the case of images, some identi-
ties are clearly not anonymized and easy to be spotted by
a human eye. Additionally, they lack control and diversity
to show differently anonymized outputs for the same input
face. Our CIAGAN model provides a general framework
in anonymizing both images and videos. By providing the
labels for the desired generated identities and mixing styles
of different identities, we have direct control over the de-
identification process. This results in not only high-quality
generated images but also with a much higher variability
between the images of the same identity (see Fig. 1).
3. CIAGAN
In this section, we detail our methodology to anonymize
images and videos. Our proposed Conditional Iden-
tity Anonymization Generative Adversarial Network (CIA-
GAN) leverages the power of generative adversarial net-
works to produce realistic images. In order to have con-
trol over the identity generation process and guarantee
anonymization, we propose a novel identity discriminator
to train CIAGAN. For the remainder of the section, we will
specifically refer to face anonymization, even though the
method is directly applicable to full bodies.
3.1. Method overview
We show a full diagram of CIAGAN in Fig. 2. The main
components of our method are the following:
Pose preservation and temporal consistency. We propose
using a landmark-based representation of the input face (or
body). This has two advantages: it ensures pose preserva-
tion which is especially useful for, e.g., tracking; it provides
a simple but efficient way to maintain temporal consistency
when working with videos.
Conditional GAN. We exploit the generative power of
GANs to produce realistic-looking results. It is important
that standard detection and tracking systems can be applied
to generated images without accuracy loss. Naturally, the
realistic-looking generated faces are easily detectable. We
achieve pose preservation by conditioning on the landmark
representation. We train the conditional GAN in an adver-
sarial game-theoretical way, where the discriminator judges
the realism of the images generated by the generator.
Identity guidance discriminator. We propose a novel
module that controls the identifying characteristics that the
generator injects to create the new image. The identity
discriminator and the generator play a collaboration game
where they work together to achieve their common goal
of generating realistic anonymized images. We now pro-
vide a more detailed description of the three modules of our
method.
3.2. Pose preservation and temporal consistency
Several de-identification methods [29, 7] take as input
the RGB image of the face to be anonymized. It is not sur-
prising that there typically is some leakage of face infor-
mation to the generated image. Thus, while those methods
produce high-quality images, the identity of the generated
faces is not fully anonymized and can be often identified by
a human.
Landmark image. To make sure our generated faces can
not be linked to the original identity, we propose to work
with an abstraction of faces. More precisely, we use face
landmark images. This has two advantages: (i) the land-
mark image contains a sparse representation of the face
with little identity information left, avoiding identity leak-
age, and (ii) the generator is conditioned on the face shape,
allowing us to preserve the input pose in the output. This is
especially important as we intend to use the generated im-
ages and videos as inputs to computer vision algorithms. In
many vision applications, e.g. tracking, methods typically
leverage the pose of the face or the body. Thereby, assur-
ing the method will not change the pose of the anonymized
face or body is extremely useful. To hide as much identity
information as possible but still preserve the pose, instead
of using all 68 landmarks [18], we use only the face silhou-
ette, the mouth, and the bridge of the nose (see Fig. 2). This
allows the network the freedom of choosing several facial
characteristics, such as eye distance or eye shape, while at
the same time, preserving expressions that are dependent on
the mouth region, e.g. smiling or laughing, and the global
pose is given by the nose position. The landmarks are rep-
resented as a binary image which is fed as input to the gen-
erator.
Masked background image. Our goal is to generate only
the face region of an image and inpainting it to the original
image background. This allows our algorithm to focus the
learning power to the generation of faces (and not that of
background), and at the same time guarantees that we do not
have background changes that could interfere with the de-
tection or tracking algorithms. To achieve this, we provide
the generative model with the masked background image to-
gether with the landmark image. The masked background
image still contains the forehead region of the head. Once
the generator has access to this information, it can learn to
match the skin appearance of the generated face to the fore-
head skin color. This leads to overall better quality of visual
results. In cases there are multiple faces in the same image,
we detect each face on the image and sequentially apply our
anonymization framework.
Our pipeline can be additionally used for full-body
anonymization by simply replacing the mask image with a
segmentation mask representing the silhouette of the body.
In our case, we do not use body joints as a replacement for
the landmark image, as the silhouette of a person suffices as
a pose prior.
Temporal consistency. In order to work on videos, any
de-anonymization pipeline must ensure the temporal con-
sistency of generated images on the video sequence. The
state-of-the-art video translation model [39] ensures tempo-
ral consistency by using a discriminator that is conditioned
on the optical flow between corresponding frames. The op-
tical flow is computed via an external neural network [6],
which makes the framework both complex and computa-
tionally expensive. In our work, due to the nature of our in-
put representation, we obtain temporal consistency for free.
The landmarks of every frame are smoothed using a spline
interpolation over neighboring frames. Therefore, we pro-
vide the same framework for both images and videos, with
the only difference being the computationally cheap inter-
polation done at inference time.
3.3. Conditional generative adversarial networks
GAN framework. In simple terms, GANs combine two
neural networks: a generator G whose goal is to gener-
ate realistic-looking samples, and a discriminator D whose
goal is to differentiate between the real samples and the
generated ones. The networks are trained in an adversarial
manner withD being trained to maximize the probability of
assigning the correct label to both training and generated ex-
amples, and G being trained to minimize the probability of
D predicting the correct labels for the generated samples. In
other words, D learns to separate the real samples from the
generated ones, whileG learns to foolD into classifying the
generated samples as real ones. It is well-known that GAN
training is hard and requires many tricks [23, 9, 4]. In this
work, we choose to train CIAGAN with the LSGAN loss
function [23]. The idea of using least-squares loss function
for GAN training is simple yet powerful: the least-squares
loss function is able to move the fake samples toward the
decision boundary, as it penalizes also samples that are cor-
rectly classified but still lie far away from real samples. This
is opposed to the cross-entropy loss that mostly penalizes
wrongly classified samples. Based on this property, LS-
GANs are able to generate samples that are closer to real
data.
The objective function of the discriminator in the LS-
GAN setting is defined as follows:
min
D
VLSGAN (D) =
1
2
Ex ∼ pdata(x)[(D(x)− b)2]+
1
2
Ez ∼ pz(z)[(D(G(z))− a)2],
(1)
where a and b are the labels for the fake and the real data.
The loss of the generator is defined as:
min
G
VLSGAN (G) =
1
2
Ez ∼ pz(z)[(D(G(z))− b)2], (2)
Without loss of generality, LSGAN can be replaced with
any of the other common loss functions used for GAN train-
ing [9, 4].
Conditional GAN. In the classic GAN training setting, a
vector of random noise is given as input to the generator
in order to provide variability to the generated images. In
our case, it is necessary for the generated faces to be aligned
with the landmarks from the input image, for pose preserva-
tion and temporal consistency. Furthermore, we also need
to blend the generated faces seamlessly with a background.
To this end, we use the conditional GAN framework [15],
where we condition the generator with a landmark and a
masked image (background), as explained in Section 3.2.
The generator uses an encoder-decoder architecture [22].
The encoder brings the landmark and the masked image
to a low-dimensional representation (bottleneck), where it
is combined with identity representation while the decoder
takes combined representation and upsamples it to generate
the anonymized RGB image.
3.4. Identity guidance
With the two modules explained above, our model learns
to generate faces that look realistic and preserve the pose of
original images. However, if the entire variability in im-
age generation is provided by the landmark input, the net-
work quickly overfits on the training set, effectively doing
only image reconstruction. By doing so, it generates faces
that are very similar to those in the training dataset, forfeit-
ing the final anonymization goal. To solve this problem,
we introduce a novel identity guidance discriminator. More
precisely, for every given real image, we randomly choose
the desired identity of its corresponding generated image.
This identity – represented as on one hot-vector – is given
as input to a transposed convolutional neural network. The
network produces a parametrized version of the identity and
feeds it into the bottleneck of the generator. In this way, the
generator learns to generate a face with some of the charac-
teristics of the desired identity while keeping the pose of the
real image. In other words, the generated image is a compo-
sition of both the landmark identity and the desired identity.
The identity of the generated image must not be the same as
any of the real identities in order for the generated image to
be not recognizable.
The identity discriminator is designed as a siamese neu-
ral network pretrained using Proxy-NCA loss [26]. Pre-
training is done using real images, where the discrimina-
tor is trained to bring together features coming from the
images that belong to the same identity. During the GAN
training, we finetune the siamese network using contrastive
loss [2]. During this fine-tuning step, we allow the siamese
network to bring together the ID representation of the fake
images and the real images. The identity discriminator and
the generator are trained jointly in a collaborative manner.
The identity discriminator’s goal is to provide a guidance
signal to the generator to guide it towards creating images
whose representational features are similar to those of a par-
ticular identity.
The case for multiple object tracking. Of particular in-
terest is the control on the fake identity generation. We need
to be able to keep the same real person-fake identity map-
ping within a sequence taken from a camera e.g., multiple
object tracking, but at the same time change the mapping
for different cameras to avoid long-term tracking and po-
tential misuse of the data. To do so, when a person moves
from one camera to another, we replace its control vector
with a new one, in turn giving the person a new identity.
This is a simple yet powerful way of doing multiple object
tracking within the frames taken from a camera, without the
undesirable consequence of doing long-term tracking.
4. Experiments
In this section, we compare CIAGAN with several
classic and learning-based methods commonly used for
identity anonymization. Our method achieves state-of-the-
art qualitative and quantitative results in different image
and video datasets. We also present a set of comprehensive
ablation studies to demonstrate the effect of our design
choices. We first introduce the datasets, evaluation metrics
and baselines used throughout this section.
Datasets. We perform experiments on 3 public datasets:
• CelebA [21] The dataset consists of 202, 599 face im-
ages of 10, 177 unique identities. We use the aligned
version where each image is centered on a point in-
between person’s eyes, and then padded and resized to
have 178× 218 resolution, while maintaining original
face proportions. Each identity contains up to 35 pho-
tos. We use HOG [5] to construct face landmarks for
each face.
• MOTS [38] Our method can also be adapted to work
in other domains such as full-body anonymization. In-
stead of using face landmarks we use body segmen-
tation masks. The dataset consist of 3, 425 videos of
1, 595 different people.
• Labeled Faces in the Wild (LFW) [12] The dataset
consists of 6, 000 pair images, split in 10 different
splits, where half of the pairs contains images of same
identity, and the remaining pairs consist of images that
have different identities.
Baselines. We compare to standard anonymization methods
as well as learning-based methods.
• Simple Anonymization methods. We use pixeliza-
tion, blur and masking of faces and compare them with
our method.
• Image Translation methods. We use the popular
pix2pix [15] and CycleGAN [41] methods. We use
the official code given by the authors, and we present
the results in the supplementary material.
• Face Replacement methods. We compare the re-
sults in de-identification with the state-of-the-art re-
sults given by [7].
4.1. Implementation details
We generate the landmarks and the masks using Dlib-ml
library [18]. We train our network on 128× 128 resolution
images, and use an encoder-decoder U-Net [31] architec-
ture for the generator. The identity vector is parametrized
by a transposed convolutional neural network containing a
fully connected layer followed by multiple transposed con-
volutional layers. The features coming from the landmark
and the identity branches are concatenated in the genera-
tor’s bottleneck. For the discriminator, we use a standard
convolutional neural network that has the same architecture
as the identity guidance network. We train our model for 60
epochs using the ADAM optimizer [19] with 1e−5 learning
rate. We set the beta hyperparameters β1, β2 to 0.5 and 0.9.
The total training time for the model is one day in a single
GPU. In the supplementary material, we give the remaining
implementation details and the network architectures.
4.2. Evaluation metrics
We evaluate all models in face detection and re-
identification metrics. We perform detection using HOG
[5] and SSH Detector [27]. To evaluate the performance
of the detectors, we use the percentage of detected faces.
For re-identification, we train a siamese neural network us-
ing Proxy-NCA [26]. Additionally, we use a pre-trained
FaceNet model [33] based on Inception-Resnet backbone
[36]. We use the standard Recall@1 evaluation metric for
re-identification. It measures the ratio of samples whose
nearest neighbor is from the same class. The metric can
take values from 0 to 100 with 0 showing perfect de-
identification rate and 100 showing perfect identification
rate. Note that in a balanced dataset, a random classifier
will produce (on average) a Recall@1 of 1/|C| where C is
the number of classes. Finally, we evaluate the visual qual-
ity of the generated images quantitatively using the Fre´chet
Inception Distance (FID) [11], a metric that compares the
statistics of generated samples to those of real samples. The
lower the FID, the better, corresponding to more similar real
and generated samples.
4.3. Ablation Study
In this section, we perform an ablation study of our
method in order to demonstrate the value of our design
choices. In Table 1, we show several variants of our model.
Siamese indicates our full model, with a siamese identity
discriminator, and using landmarks as input. Classification
indicates replacing the siamese identity discriminator by a
classification network. As we can see, the results of the de-
tection drop more than 35 percentage points (pp). We also
Models Detection (↑) Recall@1 (↓) FID (↓)
Siamese 99.9 1.3 2.1
Classification 64.6 0.4 63.2
Faces 98.3 1.1 6.5
Table 1: Ablation study of our model. First row presents the result
of our model, second row shows the result of the model where the
siamese identity guidance network is replaced with a classification
network, while the third row shows the result of the model where
the generator accepts full face images instead of landmarks.
Models Detection (↑) Identification (↓)Dlib SSH PNCA FaceNet
Original 100 100 70.7 65.1
Pixelization 16 by 16 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3
Pixelization 8 by 8 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.3
Blur 9 by 9 90.6 38.6 16.9 57.2
Blur 17 by 17 68.4 0.3 1.9 0.5
Ours 99.9 98.7 1.3 1.0
Table 2: Results of common existing detection and recognition
pre-trained methods. Lower (↓) results imply a better anonymiza-
tion. Upper (↑) results imply a better detection.
show what happens if instead of landmarks, entire face im-
ages are provided as input. In these cases, the detection rate
drops 1.6pp, and the FID score increases, showing that the
faces are both more difficult to be detected, and have lower
visual quality.
4.4. Quantitative results
Detection and Recognition. The first experiment eval-
uates two important capabilities that an anonymization
method should have: high detection rate and low identifi-
cation rate. That is, we do not want a trained system to be
able to find the identity of the newly generated face, but at
the same time, we still want a face detector to have a high
detection rate.
In Table 2, we show the detection and identification
results of our method compared to the other methods on
the CelebA dataset [21]. The detection rate of classical
HOG [5] and deep learning-based SSH [27] detectors in our
anonymized images is at almost 100%. Blurring methods
have a much lower detection rate in the images, while faces
in the pixelized images are not detectable at all.
The identification performance drops from more than
70% recall on the original dataset to 1− 1.5% recall on our
anonymized images. The CIAGAN generated images are
almost unrecognizable by any of the two identification sys-
tems. Note, pixelization methods reach 0.3% recall, equiva-
lent to random guessing, but that comes at the cost of delet-
ing all content from the image, making both detection and
identification impossible. In a setup where we want to fur-
ther use computer vision algorithms on anonymized data,
neither pixelization nor blurring is an option.
De-ID method VGGFace2 (↓) CASIA (↓)
Original 0.986 ±0.010 0.965 ±0.016
Gafni et al. [7] 0.038 ±0.015 0.035 ±0.011
Ours 0.034± 0.016 0.019± 0.008
Table 3: Comparisons with SOTA in LWF dataset. Lower (↓)
identification rates imply better anonymization.
Recognition based on landmarks. Given that the input to
our generator is a landmark image, and not the actual image
we want to de-anonymize, one might argue that an identifi-
cation method that focuses on image pixels is easily fooled
by our method, as we saw in Table 2. What happens if CIA-
GAN is attacked by an identification method trained only
on landmarks? Will it still maintain its anonymization ca-
pabilities? We perform this experiment by training a similar
identification method [26] as before, but with landmarks as
the only input. We evaluate that by only using landmarks,
we can identify up to 30.5% compared to 70.7% when using
full images. However, when the same identifier is evaluated
on the landmarks extracted from our anonymized faces, the
performance drops to 1.9% recall. Even if the original land-
marks are used as input to our generation model, CIAGAN
uses them only as prior information to fuse it with the infor-
mation coming from the embedder network.
Are we just doing face swapping? In Section 3.3, we in-
troduced a novel identity guidance network that guides the
generator to produce images with similar features to those
of a given identity. One might argue that by doing so, the
generator is learning to only do face swapping, replacing the
face of the chosen identity into the landmarks of the source
image. We show that this is not the case, by evaluating the
identification rate of our generated images on the training
set of the real images. We set the label of the generated im-
ages to the labels of their desired identity. If the generator is
learning to do only face swapping, then a recognizer would
be able to identify correctly all generated images. How-
ever, we show that this is not the case. Neither FaceNet [33]
nor our model trained in P-NCA [26] are able to achieve a
higher recognition rate than a random guesser. Additionally,
in Fig. 3 we present a qualitative experiment, where the first
image of each row contains the source images while the first
image in each column is a randomly chosen image from the
desired identities. The other images are generated. We see
that the generated images take high-level characteristics of
their given identities (such as race or sex), but differ greatly
from the real images of those identities.
4.4.1 Comparison to SOTA in de-identification
In this section, we compare the de-identification
(anonymization) power of our model compared to
state-of-the-art [7]. We follow their evaluation protocol on
the LFW dataset [12]. The dataset consists of 10 different
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Figure 3: Generated faces of our model, where a source image is
anonymized based on different identities.
splits, where each contains 600 pairs. A pair is defined as
positive if both elements share the same identity, otherwise
as negative. In every split, the first 300 pairs are positive,
and the remaining 300 pairs are negative. As in [7], we
anonymize the second image in every pair.
We use FaceNet [33] identification model, pre-trained on
two public datasets: VGGFace2 [3] and CASIA-Webface
[40]. The main evaluation metric is the true acceptance
rate: the ratio of true positives for a maximum 0.001 ra-
tio of false positives. We present the results in Table 3.
The network evaluated in real faces reaches a score of al-
most 0.99, nearly perfect identification. [7] achieves an im-
pressive anonymization performance by obtaining a score
of less than 0.04 using the networks trained in both datasets.
CIAGAN improves on this result and lowers the identifi-
cation rate to 0.034 using the network trained in [3] and
0.019 using the network trained in [40], thus improving
anonymization. On average, CIAGAN shows a 10.5% bet-
ter de-identification rate on the first dataset, and a 45.7%
better de-identification rate on the second dataset, while
keeping a high detection rate of 99.13%. The average per-
formance of 2.65% true positive rate shows that even a near-
flawless system would completely fail to find the true iden-
tities in our CIAGAN-processed data, showing the strength
of our method in achieving image anonymization.
4.5. Visual quality of the results
As can be seen in Table 1, our method reaches an FID
score of 2.08. Simple baselines such as blurring and image
translation methods reach a significantly higher (worse) FID
score. The FID score comparison and qualitative results of
the baselines can be found in the supplementary material.
We show a series of qualitative results. In Fig. 1, we
show the diversity of the generated images, when the con-
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Figure 4: Qualitative comparison with [7]. The image in the first
column is the source image. In the first row, we show the generated
images from the framework of [7], while in the second image, we
show the generated images from CIAGAN.
Source Faces as input Landmarks as input Gafni et al.
Figure 5: Qualitative comparison with [7] on temporal consis-
tency. From left to right: original frames; faces generated by our
model using faces as input; faces generated by our model using
landmarks as input, faces generated by [7].
trol vector of the identity discriminator changes. We see
that the generated images take high-level characteristics of
the desired identity (such as eye shape, race or sex) while
generating realistically looking images.
In Fig. 4, we qualitatively compare our results with
those of [7]. We see that our method not only provides im-
ages which are more dissimilar to the source image, but by
changing the control vector, our network is able to provide
much more diverse images than those of [7] where the au-
thors gradually change their control parameter λ (we can
still recognize N. Cage).
In Fig. 5, we demonstrate the temporal consistency of
our method and compare the results with those of [7]. We
see that the pose is preserved in all cases, yielding excellent
temporal consistency. At the same time, we see that the
CIAGAN version which works with landmarks produces
better looking images than the version trained on full faces.
Finally, in Fig. 6, we show an experiment on full-
body anonymization. The first image in each row is the
Source Anonymizations
Figure 6: The full-body anonymization results of our framework
in MOTS dataset.
source image, while the other images are the generated
anonymized images. In each case, we see that the generated
images keep the same posture as the source image coun-
terpart, but the clothes, colors and other parts of the body
are changed. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
time that the same framework has been successfully used to
perform both face and body de-identification.
5. Conclusions and Future Work
Data privacy in images and videos is a serious prob-
lem. As computer vision researchers, we aim to do our part
from the technological side. In this paper, we proposed a
framework for face and body anonymization in images and
videos. Our novel CIAGAN model is based on conditional
generative adversarial networks, and faces are anonymized
based on a guiding identity signal provided by a siamese
network. We have shown that our method outperforms the
state-of-the-art in de-identification while showing large di-
versity in the generated images.
A weakness of all current de-identification methods
[30, 34, 7] is that they need the original faces to be initially
detected before they can be anonymized. Consequently,
any face that has not been detected can not be anonymized.
Therefore, these methods are not deployable in systems
where anonymization must be guaranteed. Our method suf-
fers from a similar issue as it is dependent on landmark de-
tection. As future work, we plan on working on full image
anonymization and further eliminate the need for landmark
detection in order to be able to handle extreme poses.
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— Supplementary material —
Abstract
In this supplemental document, we compare the genera-
tion quality of our method to different baselines (Section 1),
qualitatively show the diversity of our generation method
(Section 2), demonstrate results on facial occlusions (Sec-
tion 3), explain the limitations of our model (Section 4), and
detail the architecture of our models (Section 5).
1. FID of baseline methods
In Table 4 we show quantitative results on the quality of
the generated images. We use the FID score [11], a metric
that compares the statistics of generated samples to those of
real samples. The lower the FID, the better. To quantify the
quality of generated samples, they are first embedded into
a feature space given by (a specific layer) of Inception Net.
Then, viewing the embedding layer as a continuous multi-
variate Gaussian, the mean and covariance are estimated for
both the generated data and the real data. The Frchet dis-
tance between these two Gaussians is then used to quantify
the quality of the samples:
FID(x, g) = ||µx − µg||22 + Tr(Σx + Σg − 2(ΣxΣg)1/2)
(3)
where (µx,Σx), and (µg,Σg) are the mean and covari-
ance of the sample embeddings from the data distribution
and model distribution, respectfully. The authors show that
the score is consistent with human judgment and is robust
to noise. Finally, FID can detect intra-class mode dropping,
e.g. a model that generates only one image per class will
have a high FID.
Our method reaches a very low FID score quantitatively
showing that the quality of the generated images is very
high. Pixelization methods unsurprisingly reach a very high
FID score. The higher the number of pixels merged together
is, the higher is the FID score. Similar behavior is seen for
the blurring methods where the higher the level of blur is,
the higher is the FID score.
We train GAN-based image translation methods [15, 41]
where the source domain are the landmarks and the target
domain are the images. We were surprised to see that the
FID score of image translation methods is very high, com-
parable to blurring methods. We investigate this by check-
ing the visual quality of the generated images. We see that
the models learn to generate only slight variations of the
same face (that can be considered an average face). We con-
jecture that the main reason for this problem is the sparse
signal of the source domain. We show a qualitative evalua-
tion of the baseline methods in Fig. 8 where our method is
the only one that generates realistically looking images.
Model FID (↓)
Pixelization 8 by 8 510.83
Pixelization 16 by 16 318.43
Blur 9 by 9 54.50
Blur 17 by 17 152.03
Pix2Pix [15] 121.41
CycleGAN [41] 185.26
Ours 2.08
Table 4: Quality and diversity measurements of different meth-
ods.
2. Diversity of the generated images
In Fig. 1 of the main paper, we showed triplets of images,
with the first image in the triplet being the source image, and
the other two images being different anonymized versions
of it.
In Fig. 9 we perform a similar experiment, but this
time instead of showing only 2 anonymized versions of the
source image, we present 9 different versions of it. We see
that the generated images have still different identities that
are sufficiently different from each other.
3. Removing glasses and mustache
In Fig. 7 we perform an experiment where the source
images contain faces of people with glasses, or with a mus-
tache. Considering that our generator uses as input the
landmarks of the face (instead of the entire face), it has
no knowledge whatsoever that the source image might con-
tain glasses. Unsurprisingly, the generated images do not
contain glasses or mustache. Note that the quality of the
generated images does not suffer and during the blending
process, the generator inpaints the region where the source
image contained the glasses.
4. Limitations
A weakness of all current de-identification methods
[30, 34, 7] is that they need the original faces to be initially
detected before they can be anonymized. Consequently,
any face that has not been detected can not be anonymized.
Thus, all the aforementioned methods are not deployable in
systems where the anonymization must be guaranteed. Our
method suffers from a similar issue, if a face does not get
detected, then its landmark will not get generated, and so
the model will not generate the anonymized version of the
face. As future work, we plan on investigating this prob-
lem in two directions: deploying an ensemble of detection
networks to minimize the probability of faces not getting
detected; and anonymizing entire images without the need
Figure 7: First column contains source images, all other
columns are anonymized versions of our method with dif-
ferent control vectors.
of detecting the original faces on them.
Another limitation of landmarks usage is the occurrence
of occlusions in front of a face. Since the generated face
is based on the landmarks, these occlusions are going to be
removed (e.g. glasses as in Fig. 7). The problem can be
resolved by detecting such occlusions and treating them as
part of the background mask.
Finally, like in other deep learning anonymization frame-
works, the more different the images are to the images of
the training dataset, the worse is the quality of the gener-
ation. CelebA dataset offers multiple images per identity
with good quality but with a significant bias towards frontal
faces (since they are using photos of celebrities). Conse-
quently, our method performs best when used in similar
datasets. For our model to perform as well in extreme poses,
it needs to be additionally trained in a dataset containing
such poses.
5. Network architecture
In Table 5 we show the architecture of the generator.
The generator uses an encoder-decoder architecture, and re-
ceives as input a 6-dimensional image that is created by con-
catenating the landmark image with the masked background
image. It encodes the input image into a 3-dimensional ten-
sor that has 256 channels. In the bottleneck, the encoded
image is concatenated with the identity embedding (that is
an output of the transposed convolution network). Finally,
the network decodes the combined embedding, to produce
the anonymized version of the source image.
In Table 6 we show the architecture of the discriminator.
The network receives as input a 3-dimensional image that
is created by combining the generated face with the masked
background image. Then it uses a series of residual blocks.
Finally it uses 2 fully-connected layers. The network has
the same architecture as the siamese network that we use
for identity guidance.
In Table 7 we show the architecture of the embedding
network. The network receives as input the label of the de-
sired identity (given in one-hot format) and produces a 3-
dimensional tensor. This tensor is fed into the bottleneck of
the generator.
Finally, we give the architecture of the residual blocks
used in all the networks. The architectures of the ”residual
block down”, ”residual block up” and ”residual block” are
given on Tables 8, 9 and 10 respectively.
Generator
Layers Output size
Input 6 x 128 x128
Residual Block Down 32 x 64 x 64
Residual Block Down 64 x 32 x 32
Residual Block Down 128 x 16 x 16
Residual Block Down 256 x 8 x 8
Residual Block Down 256 x 4 x 4
Concatenate with the ID embedding 512 x 4 x 4
3x3 stride1 conv + ReLU 256 x 4 x 4
Residual Block 256 x 4 x 4
Residual Block 256 x 4 x 4
Residual Block 256 x 4 x 4
Residual Block 256 x 4 x 4
Residual Block Up 256 x 8 x 8
Residual Block Up 128 x 16 x 16
Residual Block Up 64 x 32 x 32
Residual Block Up 32 x 64 x 64
Residual Block Up 16 x 128 x 128
3x3 stride1 conv 3 x 128 x 128
Table 5: The network architecture of our generator.
Discriminator
Layers Output size
Input 3 x 128 x128
Residual Block Down 32 x 64 x 64
Residual Block Down 64 x 32 x 32
Residual Block Down 128 x 16 x 16
Residual Block Down 256 x 8 x 8
Residual Block Down 512 x 4 x 4
FC + LeakyReLU 1024
FC + LeakyReLU 1
Table 6: The network architecture of our discriminator.
Transposed Convolutional Neural Network
Layers Output size
Input N
(FC + LeakyReLU) x 7 512
Reshape 32 x 4 x 4
3x3 stride 1 conv + LeakyReLU + IN 64 x 4 x 4
3x3 stride 1 conv + LeakyReLU + IN 128 x 4 x 4
3x3 stride 1 conv + LeakyReLU + IN 256 x 4 x 4
Concatenate with the landmark embedding 512 x 4 x 4
Table 7: The architecture of our transposed convolutional neural
network.
Residual Block Down
Input
3x3 stride1 conv + ReLU 1x1 stride1 conv
3x3 stride1 conv 2x2 average pooling
2x2 average pooling
Summation
Instance Normalization
Table 8: The network architecture for the residual block
down module.
Residual Block Up
Input
IN + ReLU 2x2 Upsample
2x2 Upsample 1x1 stride1 conv
3x3 stride1 conv + IN + ReLU
3x3 stride1 conv
2x2 average pooling
Summation
Instance Normalization
Table 9: The network architecture for the residual block up
module.
Residual Block
Input
3x3 stride1 conv + IN + ReLU
3x3 stride1 conv + IN
Summation with Input
Table 10: The network architecture for the residual block module.
IN stands for Instance Normalization [37]
Figure 8: Our method compared with other anonymization baselines. From up to down: Original, CIAGAN, Blur 17 by 17,
Blur 9 by 9, Pixelization 16 by 16, Pixelization 8 by 8, Pix2Pix, CycleGAN.
Figure 9: The images in the first column are the source images, all the other images are anonymized versions of the source
images, where the anonymization process uses different control vectors.
